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Abstract
In government procurement auctions of construction contracts, entrants are typically less informed
and bid more aggressively than incumbent rms. This bidding behavior makes them more sus-
ceptible to losses a¤ecting their prospect of survival. In April of 2000, the Oklahoma Department
of Transportation started releasing the internal cost estimates to complete highway construction
projects. Using newly developed quantile regression approaches, this paper examines the impact
of the policy change on aggressive entrants. First, we nd that the information release eliminates
the bidding di¤erential between entrants and incumbents attributed to informational asymmetries.
Second, we argue that the policy change a¤ects the prospects of survival of entrants in the market.
We nd that those who used to exit the market relatively soon are now staying 37 percent longer,
while at the median level bidding duration increased by roughly 68 percent. The policy has the
potential to encourage entry in government procurement auctions and thus increase competition.
1 Introduction
Models of imperfect competition make varying predictions about the e¤ects of entry in a market.
Contestable market theory predicts that the threat of entry alone can restrain market power. Other
theoretical work shows that barriers to entry can limit the e¤ect of potential competitors on a market,
and only actual entry can have signicant competitive e¤ects. The qualitative predictions on the
prevalence and consequences of entry depend on the market structure and characteristics. In some
industries for instance, entrants may be at a considerable disadvantage relative to incumbents due to
The authors would like to thank Pai-Ling Yin, conference participants at the 2007 International Industrial Orga-
nization Conference, and seminar participants at Texas Tech University. We are indebted to sta¤ at the Oklahoma
Department of Transportation for useful information.
yCorresponding author: Georgia Kosmopoulou, 318 Hester Hall, 729 Elm Av, Norman, OK 73019. Tel:1-405-325-3083,
Email: georgiak@ou.edu.
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asymmetric information. In the road construction industry in particular, entering rms bidding in
procurement auctions typically face higher uncertainty in developing bids. This uncertainty originates
in the lack of relevant information and production or bidding experience. Incumbents are typically
better informed on the cost and pricing of various bid components. As a result, entrant rms bid
more aggressively and win with signicantly lower bids compared to incumbents (see De Silva, Dunne
and Kosmopoulou (2003)). The uncertainty is a¤ecting the prospect of survival in these markets
and their e¤ectiveness in enhancing competition and deterring other rms from entering in collusive
agreements.
We consider construction auctions in the state of Oklahoma for a period encompassing an infor-
mation policy change, designed to eliminate informational asymmetries. In April of 2000, the Okla-
homa Department of Transportation started releasing the internal cost estimates to complete highway
construction projects. Our data provide an opportunity to examine entrant and incumbent bidding
behavior, and to some extent, their survival patterns. The information release policy was shown to in-
duce more aggressive bidding behavior by all rms reducing the cost of procurement (De Silva, Dunne,
Kankanamge and Kosmopoulou (2007)). It could, however, have a heterogeneous e¤ect on bidders,
a¤ecting the degree of competition in the market. Is this aggressive bidding behavior discouraging or
encouraging entrant rms? In the long run, is the information release favoring a few established rms
thus facilitating collusion? Our analysis shows that the asymmetry between entrant and incumbent
bidding behavior became less pronounced after the state decided to release its own engineering cost
estimate for each project. We nd that entrants submitted relatively more aggressive bids before the
policy change, fully adjusting their bidding behavior after. This additional information can help en-
trants with initially low estimates of the cost, to modify their bidding behavior and avoid undertaking
contracts at a loss. As a result, the aggressive entrants who adjust their bids upwards will most likely
prolong their presence in these auctions. Indeed, rms who used to exit the market relatively soon are
now staying 37 percent longer while, at the median level, bidding duration increased by 68 percent.
The theoretical literature has explored some aspects of bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions
(see Lebrun (1998 and 1999), Maskin and Riley (2000b) and Pesendorfer (2000)). They focused
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on settings likely to justify stochastic dominance among the distributions of values. This would be
relevant for contractors, if the opportunity cost of completing projects di¤ered among rms, and some
had systematically higher costs than others. De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2003) considered
asymmetric bidding when stochastic dominance persists for low costs but not throughout the range of
values. They provided empirical evidence of bidding asymmetries between entrants and incumbents
in construction auctions consistent with the theory. Their paper does not examine any informational
or survival e¤ects. The data set extends until August of 2000 where the information policy is for the
most period unchanged. We are not aware of any empirical literature that examines the prospects
of survival based on issues of informational asymmetries between entrants and incumbents. When
considering rm survival in markets, the literature largely deals with di¤erences in the structure and
characteristics of rms (see for example, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988), Baldwin and Gorecki
(1991), and Dunne, Kliemk and Roberts (2003)). Nevertheless, those informational asymmetries can
be critical for the composition of the pool of bidders and the level of competition in this market. For the
entire period of our analysis, construction contracts in Oklahoma had an estimated cost of 2.8 billion
dollars. The US federal and state governments paid 70 billion dollars in 2003 on road construction
contracts.1 Given the amount of government spending allocated to these projects, it is evident that
decisions on the level of information released can have a signicant impact on the budget.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical model, and section 3 presents
the data. Section 4 provides empirical results on relative bidding behavior of entrants and incumbents
and the survival of entrants. Section 5 o¤ers concluding remarks.
2 Model
We consider rst price auctions of construction contracts and focus on di¤erences in the behavior of
entrants and incumbents. Our framework accommodates asymmetries due to a di¤erential level of
experience and e¢ ciency, and provides some explanation for the observed patterns. We rst describe
1This gure was reported by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation O¢ cials at the annual
meetings of the Transportation Research Board in January of 2005. See http://www.transportation.org.
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existing results using an a¢ liated values model. This model is most suitable for construction work
since it involves typically some cost components that are known to a specic rm and relate directly
to its e¢ ciency and others that are more uncertain and common to all rms (these could be future
input prices in general or the cost of excavation and demolition in specic projects). Then, we provide
a characterization of bidding distributions in the neighborhood of low costs based on characteristics of
the cost distributions that are unique to this setting.
Consider a rst price sealed bid auction in which two risk neutral bidders compete for a government
contract.2 The cost of the contract ci to bidder i exhibits both private and common value charac-
teristics. For simplicity, we assume that ci = ti + si + (1  )
P
j sj= (n  1) for i 6= j; where ti is
an estimate of his private cost and si, is a signal which is an estimate of the common cost S. The
parameter  represents the degree of uncertainty a bidder faces in the calculation of the common
cost. In a purely private value model =1. In an a¢ liated value environment, in which bidders view
symmetrically the common component, =0. The parameter  is common knowledge to all bidders.
The privately observed component of the cost, ti + si, is drawn from a known distribution Fi with
support [tL + sL, tH + sH ]. The distribution function Fi is twice continuously di¤erentiable, and
has a density fi that is strictly positive on the support. Consideration of multidimensional types at
some level of generality may pose the problems of monotonicity and existence. Within our framework,
we can overcome this problem by making the assumption that the densities of the t0is and the s
0
is are
logconcave.3 When the bidderscosts are private and are distributed independently, LeBrun (1999)
and Maskin and Riley (2000a,b) have shown4 in general that in equilibrium the bid functions are
increasing and di¤erentiable so that, for each rm i, an inverse exists and is di¤erentiable. De Silva,
Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2003) have provided the same equilibrium solution in the case of a¢ liated
values considered here. We let b 1i (b) = i (b) be is inverse bid function. Each rm chooses a bid b
2 In this paper, we emphasize di¤erences between entrants and incumbents at a group level. Based on this distinction,
we make the simplifying assumption of two bidders with di¤erent characteristics. In fact, Lebrun (1998) shows that, the
characterization results he generates assuming two bidders with asymmetric private value distributions generalize to the
case of n bidders with no more than two di¤erent probability distributions.
3Many commonly used densities such as the uniform, normal, chi-square and exponential densities satisfy this as-
sumption (see Goeree and O¤erman (2003)).
4Their results are describing a framework in which the bidder with the highest value wins the auction. We are making
here the appropriate changes in the objective function and the conclusions to t the framework of construction contracts.
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to maximize its expected prot
i(b; ci) = (b  ci)
 
1  Fj
 
j (b)

:
The equilibrium to this model can be characterized as the solution to a system of di¤erential
equations with boundary conditions. This solution is unique and constitutes a pair of inverse bid
functions. In particular, for each i (i 6= j):
fj
 
j (b)

1  Fj
 
j (b)
0j (b) = 1[b  i (b)] (1)
where every j (b) is evaluated at b for all b in [b; b
]. These di¤erential equations should satisfy the
following boundary conditions:
Fj
 
j (b)

= 0; b = j (tH + sH) 8 j: (2)
If the distribution of the privately observed component of the cost of one bidder stochastically
dominates the cost distribution of the other, the results in Maskin and Riley (2000b) continue to
hold. Notice that, a distribution Fj rst order stochastically dominates another distribution Fi if and
only if Fi (x)  Fj (x) for all x. This can happen, if the opportunity cost of completing a project
di¤ers systematically among contractors. If the cost distribution of a weak bidder stochastically
dominates the cost distribution of a strongbidder, Maskin and Riley showed that the equilibrium
bid distribution should also exhibit stochastic dominance. The same paper establishes that if a weak
bidder faces a strong bidder rather than another weak he will bid more aggressively, and vice versa.
When considering the cost of road construction for entrants and incumbents, the stochastic dominance
relation no longer holds throughout the range of values.
2.1 Characterization of the equilibrium bid di¤erential for low estimates
of the cost
In this section, we concentrate on di¤erences in the distribution of costs between entrants and in-
cumbents in the period before and after the information release. In general, entrants are bidders
with no prior bidding experience. The distribution of estimated costs for those rms is likely to have
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a higher mean and to exhibit a much greater dispersion on average relative to that of incumbents.
These dissimilarities can be attributed to real and perceived cost di¤erences reecting larger variation
in managerial e¢ ciency and lack of relevant knowledge and experience.5 As a result, the entrants
distribution of cost estimates may not stochastically dominate that of incumbentsfor every value of
costs, and the characterization of relative bids of the previous section may no longer apply. In fact,
due to uncertainty, the stochastic relation is likely to be reversed for low values of the estimated cost
distribution. In such an environment, it is not possible to establish a general pattern of bidding dif-
ferences consistent across the distribution. Nevertheless, the stochastic relation among distributions
for low values of the estimated cost has allowed De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2003) to predict
relative bidding patterns. They have shown in their proposition that, if the cost estimates exhibit a
stochastic dominance relation at the lower end of the distribution the results by Maskin and Riley
(2000b) will continue to hold in the neighborhood of b. Fibich, Gavious and Sela (2002) established
similar conclusions for ascending auctions in the private values framework. We also place emphasis on
studying estimates at the lower end of the distribution because those bidders are more likely to win
contracts and face excessive losses.
Construction activity exhibits some degree of common cost uncertainty embedded in the perfor-
mance of tasks. This uncertainty makes bidders reluctant to bid aggressively to avoid the winners
curse. The release of information on the engineers cost estimate is expected to a¤ect the estimated
distribution of costs and change their bidding behavior (see Milgrom and Weber (1982), Goeree and
O¤erman (2003), and De Silva, Dunne, Kankanamge and Kosmopoulou (2007)). This information will
have a larger impact on entrants who have less experience to begin with. Entrants have a priori more
uncertainty about the cost estimates whose distribution is expected to be more dispersed. As a result,
we expect that the distribution of perceived costs of incumbents will stochastically dominate that of
entrants for low values of the cost. We will show here that, as the information is released, and the
stochastic dominance relation becomes weaker at the lower end of the distribution of cost estimates
5The real cost di¤erences are di¤erences in the private construction cost (having to do with volume or network
externalities) and di¤erences in managerial e¢ ciency that are unrelated to informational e¤ects.
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(due to reduced di¤erences at the level of uncertainty across the two groups), the di¤erence in the
bidding between entrants and incumbents will be lessened. No matter what the relationship is for
high values of the cost, if the estimate provided by the state eliminated informational asymmetries,
it could help the most aggressive bidders (experienced or not) formulate a uniform strategy to avoid
the potential for an excessive loss. This information strategy can help the entering rms that are least
informed and most at risk of failure to survive longer in this market.
Let fEB () and fIB () be the densities of the entrantsand incumbentsdistributions of estimated
costs for the period before the information release. Let fEA () and fIA () be the corresponding densities
for the period after the information release. We expect that, fEi
 
Ei (b)

> fIi
 
Ii (b)

for i = B;A.
Furthermore, we expect that fEB
 
EB (b)
   fIB  IB (b) > fEA  EA (b)   fIA  IA (b) >
0 reecting smaller informational asymmetries and reduced variability in perceived costs after the
information release. Based on these assumptions, we will show here that as the stochastic dominance
e¤ect weakens at the level of costs due to the information release, the bids of entrants are expected to
be closer to those of incumbents in the period after the policy change.
Proposition 1 If fEi
 
Ei (b)

> fIi
 
Ii (b)

for i = B;A and fEB
 
EB (b)
  fIB  IB (b) >
fEA
 
EA (b)
 f IA  IA (b) > 0; then IB (b) EB (b) > IA (b) EA (b) for any b 2 [b; b+"].
In words, in the neighborhood of b the bidding di¤erential between the two groups of bidders will be
smaller after the information release.
Proof. Following De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2003), we can show rst that if fIi
 
Ii (b)

<
fEi
 
Ei (b)

then Ii (b) > Ei (b) for any b 2 [b, b + "] and i = B;A: Since the lower bound
of the distribution is the same for both bidders, Ei (b) = Ii (b). Furthermore, fIi
 
Ii (b)

<
fEi
 
Ei (b)

implies that FIi (x) < FEi (x) in the right neighborhood of Ii (b).
From the equilibrium condition, we have:
fEi
 
Ei (b)

1  FEi
 
Ei (b)
0Ei (b) = 1b   Ii (b) = 1b   Ei (b) = 0Ii (b) fIi
 
Ii (b)

1  FIi
 
Ii (b)
 : (3)
It follows from (2) and (3) that 0Ei (b) < 
0
Ii (b). Therefore, for those bids observed in the neigh-
borhood of b, the associated cost of incumbents will be higher than that of entrants (i.e., Ei (b) <
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Ii (b)). In words, incumbents facing poorly informed entrants that are willing to bid low are going to
submit more competitive bids. Now consider the possibility that fEB
 
EB (b)
   fIB (IB (b) >
fEA
 
EA (b)
   fIA  IA (b) > 0. In the neighborhood of  (b), it should be the case that
FEB (x)   FIB (x) > FEA (x)   FIA (x). Considering these di¤erences in the densities and distrib-
ution functions in equation (3), we get that IB (b)   EB (b) > IA (b)   EA (b) for any b 2 [b;
b + "]. In words, as the stochastic dominance e¤ect weakens, the di¤erence between the bids of
entrants and incumbent becomes smaller in the period after the policy change.
3 Data
The data used in this paper comprises of information on all road construction projects auctioned by the
Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) from January 1997 to August 2003.6 These include
asphalt projects, tra¢ c signal projects, bridge projects, as well as, smaller drainage and clearance type
projects. Each month the Department of Transportation advertises these projects 3 weeks before the
actual bid letting date. The auctions take place using a sealed-bid format where the low bid is awarded
the contract.7 Firms must be pre-qualied to bid on most of these projects and pre-qualication
involves the submission of certied nancial statements to the state department of transportation.
This pre-qualication process determines the size of the projects a rm can bid on. Further, this pre-
qualication is related to the level of working capital available to the rm and their past success rate
in completing projects. Firms are removed from the pre-qualication list and become black listedif
they fail to complete contracts successfully.
The ODOT auction data include information on the identity of the rms that purchase the plans for
a project the plan holders, the identity and the bids of all bidders for a project, and the winning bid
if the contract is awarded. Therefore, we have information on potential bidders, the actual bidders and
the winner for each project auctioned o¤. Furthermore, for each project we can observe the location
6We have excluded state wide projects since we cannot calculate the distance between a specic project location and
rm location.
7The ODOT will reject the low bid when it is 7% above the engineering cost estimate for the project. A large number
of projects have been awarded above this threshold suggesting a non-binding reserve price rule.
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of the project, a description of the project (e.g., bridge construction, asphalt paving, etc), the details
of the project (e.g, the length and depth of the paving surface, the type of asphalt or concrete product
to utilize, the amount of excavation, etc), the days to complete the project (calendar days), and the
engineering cost estimate of the project.
The engineering cost estimate is constructed for each available project by the Department of Trans-
portation. This estimate was not released by the state authorities before April 2000 and is fully dis-
closed to potential bidders since then. The ensuing information policy change involves the release of
more than the states overall estimate of the project cost. The state now reveals its estimate for each
component of the project by releasing a set of individual cost estimates for each quantity of material
used and each important task involved. As a result, this policy change provides detailed information
that can reduce substantially the uncertainty related to common components of the cost. For exam-
ple, in one case, the state can reveal the cost of excavation which depends on soil conditions, and in
another, the cost of a specic bridge repair which depends on the extent of the damage.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the period of analysis. First, we divide the data into two
time periods. The period between January 1997 and June 1998 is used to identify incumbents and
entrants, and the period between July 1998 and August 2003 is used for data analysis. Any rm that
has submitted a bid during the rst period will be considered an incumbent in the period of analysis
starting in July of 1998. When a rm submits its rst bid after July 1998, we consider it as an entrant.
If the same rm bids again, all subsequent bids are classied as bids of an incumbent. Our denition of
entry is the same as in De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2003). This denition allows us to explore
the e¤ect of the new policy when the asymmetries in information are most pronounced. The entering
rms at this stage are more at risk of failure and easily discouraged from participation. According
to our data, the estimated probability that they will bid only once from our sample is roughly 40%.
We divide the data analysis window running from July 1998 to August 2003 in two parts: the period
before the policy change (July 1998 to March 2000) and the period after the policy change (April 2000
to August 2003). In this second period ODOT started releasing to bidders, for each project, a detailed
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account of its engineering cost estimate on all components of the cost.8
Table 1 reports on auction statistics for the full sample period and separately for the periods before
and after the policy change. In the entire period of analysis, there were 2174 projects auctioned o¤ and
1741 of them were awarded. There were approximately twice as many auctions after the information
release policy as before, consistent with the relative length of the two periods. The overall number of
auctions with an entrant was 314, 99 of which were held until March 2000 and 215 after. On average,
there were 6.2 plan holders and 3.5 bidders in each auction. There were 322 incumbent rms and
109 entrant rms at these auctions. The number of entrants in the period after the policy change
almost doubled from 37 to 72. The number of bids submitted by an entrant increased from 42 to
84 between the two periods while the number of subsequent bids submitted went up from 64 to 511.
When considering the competitive e¤ects of an entrants presence in the market, we see that before
the policy change only 17 out of 34 (45.95%) entrant rms submit a bid for a second time. In the
period after the policy change, we observe 49 entrants out of 72 (68.06%) bidding for a second time.
In a later section, we will explore, through a measure of participation, the e¤ect of the new policy on
entrantssurvival in the market.
Figure 1 considers the non-parametric kernel density estimator introduced by Rosenblatt and
Parzen in the 60s. We obtain a Gaussian kernel estimate f^h(y) of a density f on a random sample of
relative bids fy1; y2; :::yng, where h is a bandwidth that tends to zero as the number of observations n
tends to innity. We used most of the bandwidth choices considered in the literature (see, e.g., Silver-
man (1986), Scott (1992), Sheather and Jones (1991)), and we observed that the shape of the density
remains the same. Therefore, we estimate density functions in Figure 1 considering Silvermans rule
of thumb. The gure shows that both groups of bidders place on average lower, more aggressive bids,
after the policy change than before, something well established in the theoretical literature. Comparing
across the groups, for low values of the relative bids the probability mass under the entrantsdistribu-
8At the end of section 4.1, we consider an alternative denition of entry and examine bidding patterns. We classify all
bids of a rm entering after July 1998 as bids of an entrant. Placing all bids of an entering rm submitted between July
1998 and August 2003 in the same pool, assumes away some of the uncertainty that is associated with entry as there
are signicant learning e¤ects taking place along the path. As a result, this analysis is expected to show a diminished
di¤erential impact of information between entrants and incumbents. It may also understate the benecial e¤ect that
information has on entrants when they are most at risk of failure.
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Variable Full Sample Before the After the
Period Policy Change Policy Change
(06:98-08:03) (06:98-03:00) (04:00-08:03)
Total number of projects 2174 723 1424
Number of awarded projects 1741 576 1165
Average number of plan holders per 6.201 5.905 6.452
project (3.416) (3.124) (3.585)
Average number of bidders per project 3.518 3.359 3.633
(1.691) (1.630) (1.732)
Number of bids submitted by 6616 2122 4494
incumbents
Number of wins by incumbents 1710 563 1147
Incumbentsrelative bid 1.070 1.137 1.038
(.389) (.427) (.365)
Incumbentsrelative winning bid .932 .978 .909
(.231) (.232) (.228)
Number of incumbent rms 322 146 176
Entrant plan holders 423 125 298
Number of auctions with entrants 314 99 215
Number of bids submitted by entrants 126 42 84
Number of wins by entrants 31 13 18
Entrantsrelative bid 1.168 1.047 1.229
(0.938) (0.404) (1.111)
Entrantsrelative winning bid .827 .787 .856
(.302) (.319) (.296)
Number of entrant rms 109 37 72
Number of entrant rms who bid at least 66 17 49
for a second time
Number of entrant held plans at least 61 20 68
for a second time
Number of bids submitted by entrants 575 64 511
at least for a second time
Number of wins by entrants at least 111 12 99
for a second time
Entrantsrelative bid after initial bid 1.082 1.240 1.062
(.520) (.828) (.464)
Entrantsrelative winning bid after .853 .862 .852
initial winning bid (.244) (.259) (.243)
Table 1: Summary Statistics. Standard Deviations are in parenthesis.
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Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates for Relative Bids. The gure considers biddersrelative bids before
the policy change (July 1998 to March 2000) and after the policy change (April 2000 to August 2003).
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Figure 2: Cumulative Distribution Functions for Entrants and Incumbents before the policy change
(July 1998 to March 2000), and after the policy change (April 2000 to August 2003).
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tion is larger. The gure also suggests that entrantsbid variance is larger and leads to a distribution
that does not stochastically dominate that of incumbents for all range of relative bids. This pattern is
consistent with the fact that, entrants face more uncertainty about the cost of the project and greater
variation in construction cost and managerial e¢ ciency. In that case, the entrantscost distribution
does not stochastically dominate that of incumbents for all range of values.
Figure 2 presents the cumulative distribution functions for relative bids for each period separately.
The upper panel shows that the probability of submitting a relatively low bid until March 2000 is
higher for entrants than for incumbents. The crossing of the cumulative distribution functions makes
more obvious the fact that the relation of stochastic dominance does not hold for the entire range of
values. A similar pattern can be seen after the policy change, which is depicted in the lower panel of
Figure 2. The two distributions now cross at a lower level of relative bid and they are closer together for
all values of relative bid less than 1 indicating that, as proposition 1 suggests, entrants and incumbents
will bid more similarly after the information release at the low end of the distribution. Even though
these estimates support the theory, we must still be cautious in drawing nal conclusions. There are
yet no controls for di¤erences in bidder, rival, business environment, or project type characteristics.
Our next section is designed to overcome this issue.
4 Empirical Results
This section presents some basic regression models that will be used to document more precisely the
di¤erences between entrant and incumbent bidding patterns before and after the policy change. We
analyze three dimensions of the information release policy. First, we investigate the e¤ect of the
policy on bidding behavior of entrants and incumbents. Then, we consider di¤erences in participation
patterns. Finally, we study policy e¤ects on entrantsbidding times and their survival.
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4.1 Changes in Bidding Behavior of Entrants and Incumbents
In this section, we estimate a panel data model focusing on the e¤ect of the information release policy
on bidding behavior9 . Our basic econometric specication is given below as
yiat = 1Eit + 2At + 3(Eit At) + z0iat + dt + i + uiat (4)
where the unit of observation is a bid submitted by bidder i; in auction a; in month t. The relative
bid yiat is the main dependent variable used throughout the analysis, but we also use the logarithm
of bid in alternative specications. The relative bid is measured as the bid divided by the engineering
cost estimate. The variables Eit and At are indicator variables for entrants and years after the policy
change, initiated in April of 2000. The coe¢ cient on Eit, 1, measures the di¤erence in bidding between
entrants and incumbents. The coe¢ cient 2 captures the di¤erence in bids after the ODOT policy
change. Lastly, the coe¢ cient 3 measures the di¤erence in bidding behavior between entrants and
incumbents after the ODOT policy change. Our main interest is on the coe¢ cient 3. Based on the
theory, we expect the coe¢ cient 1 to be negative indicating that overall entrants bid more aggressively
than incumbents (see De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2003)). We also expect a positive di¤erence
between entrantsand incumbentsbids after the policy change (i.e., 3 > 0), at least for low values
of the bidding distribution, since the release of information reduces informational asymmetries. As a
result, entrants and incumbents should be bidding more similarly after the policy change than before.
This positive coe¢ cient on 3 is partially countering the impact that large asymmetries between the
two groups had on their bids.
In order to interpret the coe¢ cient 3 as reecting the change in bidding due to the ODOT
policy change, it is important that we control for any additional factors that could impact di¤er-
entially entrants and incumbents and could bias the coe¢ cient estimates. This is a set of controls
9A number of recent papers in the empirical auction literature have estimated structural models (e.g., Campo,
Perrigne and Vuong (2003) in an a¢ liated private value environment) or both structural and reduced form models (e.g.,
Marion (2007)) considering asymmetries in the independent private value framework). Unfortunately, given the nature
of our problem (incorporating costs with a private and common value component in an asymmetric framework and
more importantly trying to isolate the impact of reduced common cost uncertainty) the structural approach is, to our
knowledge, intractable. The reduced form approach, however, o¤ers the possibility of investigating the di¤erences at
the lower end of their bidding distribution where entrants are typically having the problem of placing a relatively large
number of bids with adverse consequences to their survival. It provides exibility in the estimation allowing us to isolate
informational e¤ects while controlling for bidder heterogeneity, auction and rival characteristics.
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z = [z01; z
0
2; z
0
3; z
0
4]
0 for additional bidder, rival and auction characteristics, as well as business condition
variables. The model also includes monthly dummy variables dts, and rm specic e¤ects is. The
rm e¤ects measure di¤erences in managerial e¢ ciency and network externalities a¤ecting private costs
that are constant over time and across auctions. The variable uiat is the error term, assumed to be
the sum of an auction specic e¤ect a and a disturbance iat, in some of the specications presented
below.
The independent variables z can be classied into four main groups (Table 2). The rst group
represents additional bidder characteristics (z1s). We include two dummy variables to control for
potential di¤erences in bidding behavior when bidders face at least one rival rm that is an entrant
in an auction. The dummy variable Bidders facing entrants controls for the di¤erence in bidding
when facing entrants. The dummy variable Bidder facing entrants after March 2000 controls for
the di¤erence in bidding behavior that occurs when a bidder faces an entrant after the ODOT policy
change. We also include three continuous variables to control for bidders capacity utilization rate,
the bidders distance to a project from its base location, and past winning to bidding ratio10 . As the
capacity utilization rises or the distance to a project location increases, we expect a bidder to submit
less aggressive bids. The variable, Firms past winning to bidding ratio, accounts for past success in
auctions. This variable is constructed as the ratio of the past number of wins to the past number of
bids. It provides information on the previous success of a rm and is included to control for di¤erences
in e¢ ciency across bidders.
In the second group, we consider rivals characteristics (z2s), using three variables. First, we utilize
past information on rivalsbidding success and construct the variable, Rivals average past winning
to plan holder ratio. The measure of rivalspast average success in auctions is constructed as the
average across rivals of the ratio of past wins to past number of plans held. Note that, a bidder must
be a plan holder in order to participate in an auction and that the plan holder list is made available
to all potential bidders prior to the auction. This variable is a measure of rival toughness. Then, we
10Alternatively, we used past number of bids and past winning to bidding ratio in the same equation. The results were
similar to the ones presented below.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Bid dummy 0.536 0.499
Winning bid dummy 0.138 0.345
Relative bid 1.072 0.406
Relative winning bid 0.930 0.233
Log of bids 13.303 1.620
Log of winning bids 12.744 1.641
Entrants entrants 0.034 0.180
Bids after March 2000 after 0.679 0.467
Entrantsbids after March 2000 entrants after 0.024 0.152
Bidders facing entrants bidders 0.165 0.371
Bidders facing entrants after March 2000 bidders after 0.115 0.319
Expected number of rivals erivals 3.617 1.928
Expected number of bidders ebidders 4.168 1.899
Log of engineering estimate 13.261 1.744
Capacity utilized capacity 0.231 0.278
Distance to the project location distance 4.283 1.591
Firms past winning to bidding ratio wbratio 0.249 0.145
Rivals average winning to plan holder ratio wpratio 0.149 0.058
Closest rivals distance to the project location rivdist 2.967 1.780
Rivals minimum backlog minback 2.357 5.073
Seasonally unadjusted unemployment rate unem 4.051 0.903
Three month average of the real volume of projects volume 1.080 0.386
Three month average of the number of building permits permits 1.008 0.173
Large rm dummy large 0.240 0.427
Asphalt paving projects asphalt 0.162 0.368
Drainage and erosion control projects drainage 0.013 0.114
Bridge work projects bridge 0.415 0.493
Grading and Draining projects grading 0.260 0.438
Concrete projects concrete 0.029 0.168
Tra¢ c signal projects tra¢ c 0.078 0.267
Miscellaneous projects misc 0.043 0.204
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Regression Variables. The second column o¤ers the names of
the variables as used in Figures 4 and 5.
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include the rivalsminimum distance to the project and the minimum backlog of the rivals. These
variables are also used to control for rival cost heterogeneity and are similar to variables used by Bajari
and Ye (2003).11
In the third group, we incorporate auction characteristics (z3s), using the expected number of
bidders and project type dummy variables. The auction participants know only the number and
identity of plan holders when they submit their bids. Bajari and Ye (2003) and Krasnokutskaya (2004)
argued that this is a small market and participants are well informed about each otherspotential to
bid. As a result, they can predict from the plan holder list more or less accurately the number of
bidders at the auction. The variable expected number of biddersis a measure of this prediction and
is used to control for di¤erences in competition across auctions. It is calculated using past information
for the rms in the plan holder list. First, we take the past bidding to plan holder ratio for each
rm, which is the probability of participation. Then for an auction at time t, we sum across these
participation probabilities for all plan holders in an auction.12 This variable construction is similar to
the ones used by Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003).13 We also use project type dummies to control
for the fact that we observe di¤erences in bidding across project categories. All projects are grouped
into seven main categories based on the description of the project. They are asphalt paving projects,
clearance and bank protection projects, bridge projects, grading and drainage projects, concrete work,
tra¢ c signals and lighting projects, and miscellaneous projects. The dummy on miscellaneous projects
is the omitted group in the regressions.
The nal set of variables represents market factors (z4s) that change over time. Three variables
are included to control for the business environment: (1) the variation in the amount of projects being
11See also Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2003), and De Silva, Jeitschko and
Kosmopoulou (2005).
12 In an alternative formulation, we used number of plan holders instead of expected number of bidders as a robustness
check. We estimated all the variants of the models observing that the change in variable does not alter the ndings. We
found that entrants made an adjustment in their bidding behavior after the policy change as the theory predicts.
13When estimating probit models we use expected number of rivals. This is constructed based on the number of rival
planholders.
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Independent Variable Bid Regression
OLS Fixed E¤ects
Relative Bid Log of Bid Relative Bid Log of Bid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entrants (1) -.188
 -.239 -.020 -.103
(.068) (.096) (.064) (.084)
Bids after March 2000 (2) -.130
 -.114 -.116 -.098
(.016) (.014) (.019) (.015)
Entrantsbids after March 2000 (3) .299
 .216 .074 .132
(.139) (.115) (.081) (.104)
Bidders facing entrants (4) .037 -.021 .012 -.023
(.039) (.024) (.044) (.032)
Bidders facing entrants after .104 .110 .102 .104
March 2000 (5) (.058) (.038) (.058) (.040)
Number of Observations 6742 6742 6742 6742
Adj.R2 .059 .973 .038 .955
Table 3: Least Squares Results for Relative Bids and Log of Bids.  Denotes statistical signicance
at the 5 percent level and  denotes statistical signicance at the 10 percent level. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. In the log regression equations, we are using log of engineering estimate and
log of expected number of bidders as independent variables.
let,14 (2) the monthly unemployment rate,15 and (3) the three month moving average of building
permits.16 The rst variable measures the real volume of projects auctioned o¤ in each state. The
aggregate real volume of projects auctioned o¤ in a month will vary due to budgetary conditions and
seasonal factors. This may a¤ect bidding behavior if rms bid more or less aggressively as the relative
real volume of projects being auctioned o¤ changes. With respect to the state unemployment rate
and the state building permits, we expect that as they change over time, rmsnon-state construction
activity may uctuate and may a¤ect bidding on ODOT projects.
Table 3 presents OLS and xed e¤ects results considering both relative bids and logarithm of bids
as dependent variables. These models were estimated using the covariates described above, but we
simply present the results on the e¤ects of interest. Considering the possibility that the standard errors
may be underestimated (Moulton 1990), we report cluster robust standard error where clustering is
14This variable measures the three month moving average of the real volume of all projects for Oklahoma. The real
volume of projects is constructed by adding the engineering cost estimates across projects up for bid in a month for
Oklahoma and deating the current value by the PPI. Then we divide it by the average of the real volume for each state
to calculate the relative real volume.
15The monthly state-level unemployment rate for Oklahoma was collected from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
16The data set was obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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on rms in the OLS regressions, and on auctions in the xed e¤ects regressions. The results of
the rst two columns suggest that entrants bid on average more aggressively than incumbents, but
adjusted their bids upwards after the policy change. The last two columns report results when rm
e¤ects are introduced to account for unobserved di¤erences in managerial e¢ ciency and overall private
costs. On average, entrants bid more aggressively than incumbents, but now the estimated e¤ects are
insignicant. This may suggest that existing informational asymmetries between the two groups of
bidders do not play a fundamental role in explaining average di¤erences in bidding behavior. This is
plausible since we believe that the information provided by the state (or the lack of it) impacts the
variability of bids but not their mean level.
With regard to the other variables in the model, the expected number of bidders has a signicant
negative e¤ect in the relative bid specications. Increased competition results in lower procurement
costs for the state. The only other variable that consistently matters is the unemployment rate. As
unemployment rises, bidders are competing more intensely for projects.17
The conditional mean model estimated above is limited if the focus is rather on bidding patterns
between entrants and incumbents in the lower tail of the conditional distribution of relative bids. One
can investigate this issue considering a simple quantile regression model of the form,
QYiat( jxiat) = x0iat()
where Q(j) is the  -th conditional quantile function, () = (1(); 2(); 3(); ()0)0 is the vector
of parameters, and xiat = [Eit At EitAt z0iat]0 is the vector of independent variables. Koenker and
Bassett (1978) suggest to estimate the quantile model via optimization, nding
^() = argmin
X
i
X
a
X
t
 (yiat   x0iat())
where  (u) = u( I(u < 0)) is the quantile regression check function18 . We restrict the estimation
to ve quantiles  = f0:1; 0:25; 0:5; 0:75; 0:9g.
17There is a more extensive discussion of most of these variable and their e¤ects on bidding behavior in general in De
Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2003) and De Silva, Dunne, Kankanamge and Kosmopoulou (2007). We focus here on
the e¤ects of the information policy change across the two groups of bidders.
18There are several methods for doing inference in quantile regression (see, e.g., Koenker 2005). The alternatives
include rank-based methods, resampling approaches, and estimation of the asymptotic covariance matrix. We consider
the latter approach, which is implemented in most of the statistical softwares.
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Variable Quantile
.10 .25 .50 .75 .90
Dependent Variable = Relative Bids
Entrants (1) -.244
 -.130 -.103 -.025 -.069
(.046) (.037) (.037) (.053) (.098)
Bids after March 2000 (2) -.100
 -.095 -.095 -.108 -.151
(.012) (.009) (.010) (.014) (.027)
Entrantsbids after March 2000 .181 .047 .093 .114 .307
(3) (.056) (.044) (.045) (.064) (.116)
Bidders facing entrants (4) -.095
 -.018 .011 .019 .033
(.018) (.015) (.015) (.021) (.038)
Bidders facing entrants after .140 .050 .076 .153 .279
March 2000 (5) (.022) (.018) (.017) (.025) (.045)
Number of Observations 6742 6742 6742 6742 6742
P-value from testing H0 : 1 = 3 0.000 0.026 0.011 0.212 0.066
P-value from testing H0 : 4 = 5 0.000 0.027 0.031 0.002 0.002
P-value from testing H0 : 1 + 3 = 0 0.058 0.001 0.702 0.021 0.001
P-value from testing H0 : 4 + 5 = 0 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dependent Variables = Log of Bids
Entrants (1) -.315
 -.157 -.115 -.057 -.060
(.069) (.039) (.034) (.044) (.063)
Bids after March 2000 (2) -.120
 -.099 -.093 -.088 -.100
(.017) (.010) (.009) (.012) (.017)
Entrantsbids after March 2000 .256 .072 .100 .141 .197
(3) (.083) (.046) (.041) (.053) (.075)
Bidders facing entrants (4) -.126
 -.011 .007 .021 .056
(.027) (.015) (.013) (.017) (.024)
Bidders facing entrants after .182 .049 .065 .085 .102
March 2000 (5) (.033) (.018) (.016) (.021) (.029)
Number of Observations 6742 6742 6742 6742 6742
P-value from testing H0 : 1 = 3 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.032 0.005
P-value from testing H0 : 4 = 5 0.000 0.063 0.039 0.074 0.362
P-value from testing H0 : 1 + 3 = 0 0.231 0.002 0.547 0.009 0.003
P-value from testing H0 : 4 + 5 = 0 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 4: Quantile Regression Results for Relative Bids and Log of Bids.  Denotes statistical signi-
cance at the 5 percent level and  denotes statistical signicance at the 10 percent level. Note that in
log runs, we are using log of engineering estimate and log of expected number of bidders as independent
variables.
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The results of Table 4 indicate that entrants submit more aggressive bids than incumbents in the
lower tail of the conditional distribution of relative bids. Furthermore, the di¤erences in the bidding
behavior between these groups of bidders becomes smaller after the policy change at the .10, .25,
and .50 quantiles, holding everything else constant. The table also shows that the di¤erence between
1 and 3 is statistically signicant at the .10 and .25 quantiles. These results are in agreement with
the theoretical ndings in section 2. We see that (a) entrants bid more aggressively than incumbents,
and (b) the di¤erence in bidding behavior of these two groups tends to be smaller after the policy
change.
Consider for a moment the possibility that the distribution of costs of an entrant stochastically
dominated the distribution of an incumbent. Proposition 3.5 of Maskin and Riley (2000b) in the
context of the presented work establishes that: (1) if an entrant bidder faces an incumbent rather
than another entrant, he bids more aggressively; and symmetrically, (2) if an incumbent bidder faces
an entrant bidder rather than another incumbent, he bids less aggressively. Here we can compare
how bidders behave if they face an entrant in an auction versus incumbents alone. The coe¢ cient of
the variable bidder facing entrantsshould be positive indicating that the presence of weak bidders
(entrants) induces less aggressive behavior on average. Now, since we believe that the relation of
stochastic dominance does not hold throughout the distribution in general, when there is common
and private cost uncertainty, we do not necessarily expect statistically signicant evidence of such a
relationship until March 2000. After March 2000, however, one expects that the major di¤erence in the
distribution of costs will be due to private cost di¤erences and not common cost di¤erences since most
of the uncertainty should disappear. In that case, a clearer pattern of stochastic dominance may arise.
In other words, it is more likely to observe any such e¤ect after the policy change than before. The
empirical ndings seems to be in agreement with these theoretical implications. For instance, Table 4
shows a positive and signicant coe¢ cient on the variable bidder facing entrantsafter March 2000
at any quantile of the conditional distribution of the responses.
As discussed above, the observed di¤erences between entrants and incumbents bidding behavior
can be attributed to perceived and real cost di¤erentiations. The previous model, however, confounds
22
the e¤ect of uncertainty embedded in the performance of tasks with the structure of private costs
on bidding behavior. To get around this problem, we now consider a quantile regression model with
biddersxed e¤ects,
QYiat( jxiat; i) = x0iat() + i:
This model can be estimated using a newly developed method for estimation that considers estimating
simultaneously J quantiles, solving,
f^(); ^ig = argmin
X
j
X
i
X
a
X
t
!jj (yiat   x0iat( j)  i);
by interior point methods (Koenker 2004). While the covariates e¤ect is to shift the location, scale,
and possibly the shape of the conditional distribution of the response, the e¤ect i represents an
individual location shift that is independent of the quantiles  js. The weight !j controls the inuence
of the jth quantile on the estimation of the individual e¤ects. We restrict attention to constant weights
equal to 1=J over the quantiles f0:1; 0:25; 0:5; 0:75; 0:9g:19
We nd that entrants bid more aggressively than incumbents as before, but now we see that the
di¤erences in bidding behavior are insignicant beyond the 0.1 quantile. Moreover, entrants seem to
adjust their bidding after the policy change by submitting relatively higher bids. (At the 0.1 quantile,
the sum between 1 and 3 is statistically insignicant). The upper part of Table 5 shows that, after
introducing individual xed e¤ects that are likely to control for di¤erences in private costs, entrants
(a) bid more aggressively than incumbents in the lower tail of the conditional bid distribution, and (b)
make a full adjustment by bidding less aggressively after the policy change.
Figure 3 presents estimates of the intercept and the main covariates e¤ects as a function of the
quantile  of the conditional distribution of relative bids. While the rst six plots show quantile
regression estimates, the remaining plots depict xed e¤ects quantile regression results. In each graph,
the continuous dotted line shows the estimates, and the shaded region represents a .95 (pointwise)
19We explored the possibility of using two schemes for inference. First, we estimate the asymptotic covariance matrix
derived in Koenker (2004, p. 79), considering Powells (1991) kernel method to estimate the nuisance parameter f(()).
We also considered a resampling method that accommodates to forms of heterocedasticity replacing pairs fyi;xig over
cross-sectional units i. We observed that both methods produce similar results, but the estimation of the asymptotic
covariance matrix is computationally attractive to resampling methods for multilevel responses.
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Variable Quantile
.10 .25 .50 .75 .90
Dependent Variable = Relative Bids
Entrants (1) -.201
 -.011 -.010 -.050 -.072
(.119) (.067) (.050) (.056) (.066)
Bids after March 2000 (2) -.103
 -.089 -.093 -.099 -.124
(.010) (.008) (.008) (.010) (.014)
Entrantsbids after March 2000 .246 .047 -.036 -.065 .171
(3) (.118) (.074) (.062) (.065) (.078)
Bidders facing entrants (4) -.151
 -.016 .007 .053 -.083
(.035) (.020) (.017) (.026) (.038)
Bidders facing entrants after .167 .046 .063 .099 .226
March 2000 (5) (.038) (.023) (.021) (.034) (.063)
Number of Observations 6742 6742 6742 6742 6742
P-value from testing H0 : 1 = 3 0.057 0.665 0.809 0.895 0.072
P-value from testing H0 : 4 = 5 0.000 0.132 0.123 0.412 0.117
P-value from testing H0 : 1 + 3 = 0 0.129 0.307 0.243 0.001 0.037
P-value from testing H0 : 4 + 5 = 0 0.226 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dependent Variables = Log of Bids
Entrants (1) -.289
 -.117 -.002 -.034 -.101
(.173) (.132) (.053) (.055) (.050)
Bids after March 2000 (2) -.115
 -.097 -.089 -.087 -.096
(.011) (.009) (.007) (.009) (.010)
Entrantsbids after March 2000 .332 .149 -.040 -.014 -.002
(3) (.172) (.136) (.066) (.065) (.057)
Bidders facing entrants (4) -.175
 -.020 -.008 -.024 -.092
(.051) (.019) (.017) (.020) (.028)
Bidders facing entrants after .188 .052 .070 .091 .076
March 2000 (5) (.053) (.023) (.021) (.027) (.037)
Number of Observations 6742 6742 6742 6742 6742
P-value from testing H0 : 1 = 3 0.070 0.316 0.734 0.837 0.311
P-value from testing H0 : 4 = 5 0.000 0.072 0.032 0.126 0.791
P-value from testing H0 : 1 + 3 = 0 0.186 0.367 0.321 0.151 0.001
P-value from testing H0 : 4 + 5 = 0 0.418 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 5: Fixed E¤ects Quantile Regression for Relative Bids and Log of Bids.  Denotes statistical
signicance at the 5 percent level and  denotes statistical signicance at the 10 percent level. Note
that in log runs, we are using log of engineering estimate and log of expected number of bidders as
independent variables.
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Figure 3: Quantile Regression and Fixed E¤ects Quantile Regression Results. We report the estimates
of the e¤ects of interest. The continuous dotted lines show the estimates, and the shaded region
represents a .95 (pointwise) condence interval.
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condence interval for the point estimates. For instance, the second graph on the top row shows
estimates of the di¤erential e¤ect in bidding between entrants and incumbents, ^1:While the estimate
is negative and signicant at the 0.1 quantile, it is close to zero and insignicant at the 0.9 quantile. The
advantage of Figure 3 is that it allows us to carefully examine the di¤erence between the distributions of
bids at any quantile  . In light of the theory, we would expect to see a positive estimate ^3 in the lower
tail. We observe that the estimates related to the bidding di¤erential e¤ects after the policy change
are positive and signicant at the 0.1 quantile, suggesting that entrants made a relative adjustment in
their bidding behavior of about 20 percent after the policy change. The results are in agreement with
the theory, hence introducing rm e¤ects do not drastically alter the main empirical nding. Notice
also that, the graphs on entrants and entrants after appear to be mirror images of one another
particularly in the xed e¤ects model signifying that when the informational asymmetries disappear
bidders adjust their strategies accordingly to eliminate relevant di¤erences in their behavior.
Next, we investigate empirically the question of whether the policy change had an e¤ect on the
number of participants. We estimated a Poisson model for the number of bidders and number of plan
holders, considering the policy variables, auction characteristics, and business condition variables. We
found that entrants were weakly attracted by the policy change, since the coe¢ cient on the variable
identifying entrants after the policy change was not statistically signicant.20
Although entrants do not seem to enter the market at a di¤erent rate in the period after the policy
change, one might think that they would self-select into small projects. The ODOT data, however,
does not provide such evidence. Even though the median engineering estimate on projects they bid is
slightly lower than the median for the entire sample of projects, the average level is slightly above the
sample average. Nevertheless, it is possible that entrantsbehavior may take into account additional
auction characteristics, some of them unobserved by the econometrician. We investigate this potential
issue introducing auction specic e¤ects as in the previous conditional quantile function. Ideally, we
would like to estimate a linear quantile function QYiat( jxiat; i; a) conditional on policy variables
and independent variables xiat, rm e¤ects is, and auction e¤ects as, but some of the policy
20These results are available by the authors upon request.
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Variable 10 percent 15 percent 20 percent
Before After Before After Before After
Entrants .187 .147 .212 .141 .103 .094
(.100) (.068) (.096) (.065) (.064) (.053)
Bidders facing entrants .035 -.080 .040 -.035 .028 -.030
(.031) (.024) (0.25) (.019) (.014) (.016)
Expected numbers of .002 .030 -.003 .015 -.003 .004
bidders (.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.002) (.003)
Capacity utilized -.078 -.013 -.042 -.028 -.013 -.038
(.046) (.042) (.038) (.031) (.015) (.021)
Distance to the project .003 -.002 -.001 .005 .001 .004
location (.007) (.007) (.006) (.007) (.003) (.006)
Firms past winning to .237 .360 .151 .273 .038 .170
bidding ratio (.087) (.080) (.058) (.062) (.027) (.047)
Rivals average winning .377 .092 .264 .010 .116 .049
to plan holder ratio (.196) (.139) (.125) (.121) (.067) (.088)
Closest rivals distance .002 -.003 .004 -.002 .002 -.004
to the project location (.004) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.003)
Rivals minimum backlog -.001 .001 -.001 -.001 -.002 -.003
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Seasonally unadjusted -.030 .090 -.016 .055 -.013 .023
unemployment rate (.018) (.017) (.013) (.013) (.007) (.009)
Three month average of .269 -.013 .138 -.004 .061 .005
the real volume of projects (.132) (.034) (.098) (.026) (.057) (.018)
Three month average of .919 -.367 .914 -.167 .404 -.049
the number of building permits (.397) (.122) (.309) (.090) (.219) (.058)
Number of Observations 1582 5142 1582 5142 1582 5142
Adj. R2 .103 .054 .132 .054 .187 .065
Table 6: Probability of bidding below engineering cost before and after March 2000.  Denotes
statistical signicance at 5 percent level and  denotes statistical signicance at 10 percent level.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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variables cannot be identied. There is no within auction variation before and after the policy change
to identify the policy e¤ects of interest. Alternatively, we estimated the conditional quantile function
by letting the smallest estimates of auction specic e¤ects ^a ! 0 (Lamarche 2006). Although this
estimation procedure could potentially generate small biases, it gave us the opportunity of controlling
for auction specic unobserved e¤ects while estimating the policy variablese¤ects on the conditional
distribution of relative bids yiat. In this model, the auction e¤ects, as, should control for di¤erences
in e¢ ciency at the average level for all rms participating in an auction. The results are similar to
the ones described in Table 4, so we omit the presentation to avoid repetition in our discussion. The
ndings again suggest that entrants bid more aggressively than incumbents, and bid less aggressively
after the policy change.21
Finally, another way to look at the bidding di¤erences between the two groups is to estimate the
conditional probability of bidding 10, 15, and 20 percent below the engineering cost estimate. According
to the predictions of the theory, we expect to nd the estimate of the parameter 1; describing the
di¤erence in bidding between entrants and incumbents, to be (a) positive and signicant before the
policy change, and (b) smaller and possibly close to zero after the policy change. The results in Table
6 suggest that although entrants have a higher probability of bidding below the engineering cost than
incumbents, the probability di¤erences tends to be smaller after the information release.
The denition of entry, that has been used so far, allowed us to investigate the behavior of entering
rms when the uncertainty is most pronounced and the likelihood of failure is larger. As those rms
continue bidding and start undertaking projects, the di¤erence in the amount of information possessed
by surviving entrants and incumbents, and the bidding di¤erential attributed to this informational dis-
parity should become smaller. This prediction can be simply investigated by estimating rmsbidding
patterns while considering as entrantsbids to be all their bids submitted within the period of analysis.
Once more, the results of Table 7 suggest that (a) entrants bid more aggressively than incumbents in
the lower tail of the conditional distribution of relative bids, and (b) the bidding di¤erential is smaller
21 In a di¤erent line of work, Krasnokutskaya (2004) considers private value procurement auctions with an auction
specic common cost component that is known to all bidders and unknown to the researcher. The e¤ort is concentrating
in the identication of the unobserved auction heterogeneity. Unlike our paper, in her work any heterogeneous group of
bidders has the same information about the common costs.
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Variable Quantile
.10 .25 .50 .75 .90
Method = Quantile Regression
Entrants (1) -.126
 -.066 -.042 -.027 -.055
(.033) (.023) (.022) (.037) (.052)
Bids after March 2000 (2) -.099
 -.093 -.096 -.104 -.145
(.013) (.009) (.009) (.016) (.023)
Entrantsbids after March 2000 .095 .051 -.028 -.036 -.031
(3) (.036) (.025) (.024) (.040) (.056)
Bidders facing entrants (4) -.104
 -.015 .011 .053 .022
(.021) (.014) (.014) (.023) (.033)
Bidders facing entrants after .151 .049 .075 .153 .282
March 2000 (5) (.025) (.017) (.016) (.027) (.039)
Number of Observations 6742 6742 6742 6742 6742
P-value from testing H0 : 1 = 3 0.001 0.012 0.125 0.399 0.410
P-value from testing H0 : 4 = 5 0.000 0.031 0.026 0.004 0.000
P-value from testing H0 : 1 + 3 = 0 0.031 0.133 0.157 0.628 0.034
P-value from testing H0 : 4 + 5 = 0 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Method = Fixed E¤ects Quantile Regression
Entrants (1) -.060 -.014 .049 .067 .091

(.038) (.037) (.045) (.043) (.041)
Bids after March 2000 (2) -.103
 -.090 -.092 -.095 -.114
(.010) (.008) (.008) (.010) (.014)
Entrantsbids after March 2000 .073 .022 -.045 -.083 -.108
(3) (.043) (.039) (.048) (.048) (.047)
Bidders facing entrants (4) -.151
 -.014 .010 .038 .084
(.036) (.020) (.017) (.025) (.038)
Bidders facing entrants after .172 .045 .060 .124 .228
March 2000 (5) (.038) (.023) (.021) (.033) (.063)
Number of Observations 6742 6742 6742 6742 6742
P-value from testing H0 : 1 = 3 0.095 0.634 0.309 0.087 0.021
P-value from testing H0 : 4 = 5 0.000 0.148 0.167 0.114 0.115
P-value from testing H0 : 1 + 3 = 0 0.411 0.578 0.792 0.410 0.310
P-value from testing H0 : 4 + 5 = 0 0.137 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 7: Quantile Regression Results for Relative Bids.  Denotes statistical signicance at the 5
percent level and  denotes statistical signicance at the 10 percent level. The table shows results
based on entrants dened as rms that submit a bid after July 1998.
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after the policy change. As expected, the coe¢ cient estimates are notably reduced relative to the ones
presented in Tables 4 and 5.
4.2 Changes in Participation and Winning Patterns of Bidders
In this section, we examine the rate of participation of both entrants and incumbents before and after
the information release, and consider changes in the probability of winning across the two groups.
Table 8 presents the rst set of regression results describing those patterns. Both models of this
table are estimated with a set of monthly dummy variables along with the controls for bidder, rival,
auction characteristics and business conditions introduced in the previous sections. The standard errors
reported are cluster-robust standard errors where the clustering is on rms. The rst two columns
of Table 8 report on the probability of bidding. The last two columns report on the probability
of winning conditional upon bidding. The results indicate that entrants bid less frequently than
incumbents do, but conditional on bidding, only entrants that are identied by their rst bid win with
higher probability. Entrantsparticipation and winning patterns on average did not show a statistically
signicant change after the information release; adjustments made by both groups left their chances
to bid and win una¤ected.
When considering other variables, the ones that appear to have the most consistent impact are the
expected number of rivals, rivalsdistance to the project, biddersown distance to the project, and
past winning to bidding ratio. As the expected number of rivals or a rms own distance to the project
location increases, a bidder become less inclined to participate and has a low probability of winning.
Further, as a rivalsdistance to project location increases a bidders probability of submitting a bid
and winning increases. On the other hand, if the rm has a higher past winning to bidding ratio,
in other words if it is more e¢ cient, then it has a higher probability of participation and probability
to win conditional upon bidding. The variables that measure business conditions show no signicant
impact on either participation or winning patterns.
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Variable Probability of
Bidding Winning
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Entrants (1) -.156
 -.185 .227 .038
(.059) (.045) (.082) (.047)
Bids after March 2000 (2) .000 .015 .008 .009
(.022) (.021) (.022) (.022)
Entrantsbids after March 2000 (3) -.071 -.031 -.075 -.045
(.070) (.054) (.067) (.050)
Bidders facing entrants (4) -.018 -.019 -.024 -.031
(.028) (.027) (.027) (.027)
Bidders facing entrants after March 2000 (5) -.059 -.040 .035 .037
(.036) (.037) (.038) (.038)
Expected number of rivals -.022 -.021 -.033 -.032
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Capacity utilized .027 .001 -.056 -.061
(.039) (.038) (.025) (.025)
Distance to the project location -.019 -.016 -.021 -.021
(.003) (.008) (.005) (.005)
Firms past winning to bidding ratio .247 .203 .476 .441
(.102) (.092) (.052) (.055)
Rivals average past winning to plan holder ratio .066 .127 -.189 -.192
(.181) (.172) (.150) (.150)
Closest rivals distance to the project location .021 .020 .008 .008
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Rivals minimum backlog -.002 -.002 .001 .001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Seasonally unadjusted unemployment rate -.002 .005 -.013 -.013
(.008) (.012) (.010) (.011)
Three month average of the real volume of projects -.022 -.019 .005 .005
(.018) (.021) (.024) (.024)
Three month average of the number of building -.083 -.124 .062 .065
permits (.061) (.087) (.072) (.079)
Number of Observations 12579 12579 6742 6742
Wald 2 255.29 305.87 310.11 292.50
Table 8: Bidder Participation and Winning Patters considering alternative entry denitions. While
in column (1) entrants are identied considering only their rst bid, in column (2) entrants are rms
submitting bids after July 1998.  Denotes statistical signicance at 5 percent level and  denotes
statistical signicance at 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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4.3 Survival of Entrants
We focus now on entrants considering two periods: before (B) and after (A) the information release. We
will rst provide a theoretical foundation for survival analysis and then present our empirical ndings.
Our notion of survival in this market is associated with the number of months a rm continues bidding
in the procurement auctions.
We index the time period by t = fB;Ag. The information release decreases the common cost
uncertainty and therefore decreases the variance of the perceived distribution of costs. Consider for
simplicity the case where the true cost is the same in both periods. In that case, when we compare
entrantsdistributions across periods, we expect that the distribution of perceived cost after the in-
formation release will stochastically dominate the distribution of costs before the information release
at the lower tail. With that in mind, we will consider properties of the hazard rate across periods and
relate their implications on expected prots to the survival of entrants.
It is well known that if the distribution of costs exhibits stochastic dominance the hazard rate
exhibits a stochastic dominance relation as well. We can easily establish that this is also true if
the stochastic dominance relation is only conned at the lower tail of the distribution. That is, if
fEB
 
EB (b)

> fEA
 
EA (b)

for any b 2 [b; b + ], and consequently FEA(x) < FEB (x) in the right
neighborhood of E(b), then,
fEB
 
EB (b)

1  FEB
 
EB (b)
 > fEA  EA (b)
1  FEA
 
EA (b)
 :
The hazard rate represents the probability that the bid will be in the right neighborhood of b given
that it is as high as b. The interpretation of this hazard rate inequality is the following: Fix a target
level of cost that can produce a bid b. Any realization of the cost greater than that, leads to at least as
high a bid. The probability of bidding at least as high as b then is 1  FEt(Et (b)). The provision of
information increases the likelihood of higher bids in [b; b + ]; and the hazard rate above represents
the rate of such an increase. Since the actual cost is the same across periods and all that changes
is the available information and the distribution of perceived costs, we can see that entrants are now
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Time Survival Function Estimates
Before the Policy Change After the Policy Change
1 Month .433 .641
(.091) (.054)
2 Months .300 .573
(.084) (.058)
3 Months .267 .533
(.081) (.061)
5 Months .200 .456
(.073) (.066)
15 Months .125 .424
(.062) (.069)
Table 9: Kaplan-Meier Estimates for the Bidding Times Probability by periods: July 1998 to March
2000 (second column) and April 2000 to August 2003 (third column). Standard Errors are in paren-
thesis.
bidding higher at the low tail of the distribution. With that in mind consider an entrants prot as,
Et = (bt   cE) (1  FI(I (bt)) :
If the bid is higher in the period after the information release, the prot margin will increase but
the probability to win a contract may increase or decrease depending on the behavior of incumbents.
Incumbents receive the same information as the entrants making adjustments in anticipation of the
entrants strategies. If, as we observe in the data, the probability of a win does not change across the
two periods then entrants who adjust their bids upwards will have a higher prot margin and will make
a higher prot on average on any project they win. Therefore, they will survive for longer periods of
time.
This last argument suggest the possibility that the information release will a¤ect the length of
bidding activity of entrants. The idea is that an entrants probability of surviving t periods of time
should be higher after the policy change. Therefore they should continue bidding in Oklahoma for a
longer period of time.22 A simple rst empirical test could consider estimating the probability that
entrants bids t months before and after the policy change, which is presented in Table 9. Standard
non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival function estimates suggests that the number of months within
which a rm is submitting bids decline more rapidly in the period until March 2000 than in the period
22We consider the number of months an entrant submits a bid as a measure of bidding time in the Oklahoma market.
We do not di¤erentiate between instances in which one or two bids were submitted by a bidder.
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after March 2000. For instance, while the probability of bidding for 3 months is 27 percent before the
information release, it rises up to 53 percent after March 2000.
We need to draw attention to two important issues associated with this analysis using ODOT
data. First, the number of observations is drastically reduced as the sample now only includes en-
trants.23 Consequently, the quantile regression analysis presented below will be restricted to  =
f0:25; 0:4; 0:5; 0:6; 0:75g. Second, when we examine the survival of rms, we consider a rm exiting the
Oklahoma market if it did not submit any bid for a period extending beyond 12 months. If by the
end of the sample period the rm (a) did not submit a bid, and (b) its last bid was submitted within
a year, the observation is treated as censored. This twelve month cuto¤ is based on the fact that
roughly 90 percent of the projects are completed within a year. Consequently, most of the rms will
have very limited backlog after a year and a higher incentive to bid. In our entire sample period and
considering all rms, it takes on average 2.4 months between submissions of bids by a bidder, while in
90% of cases the time distance between the placement of two bids is at most 5 months, and in 95% of
the cases it is at most 8 months. We created a window that is 4 months larger than the estimate of
the 95th percentile to be as condent as possible about our prediction of exit. In general, however, it
is not possible to know with certainty if a rm is out of the market or still competing in it, when there
is no bid submitted for an extended period.
Keeping in mind the issues, we estimate the impact of the release of the engineering costs on the
bidding times distribution. We consider a quantile regression model,
Qh(T )( jx) = x0();
where h() is a monotone function, and T denotes number of months a rm continues bidding in
the Oklahoma auction market. Koenker and Geling (2001) noted that a logarithmic transformation
gives a quantile regression approach for the accelerated failure time model, which can be written as
23We omit the survival analysis for incumbents here. This is because it poses di¤erent considerations than that for
entrants. Note that, incumbents have been dened as the rms that submitted a bid before July 1998. Those rms,
if they continue bidding after March 2000, will be established rms and their survival in the market may be highly
correlated with their stage of maturity and experience, not necessarily with the release of information.
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h(T ) = x0 + u with h() = log():24 In the quantile regression model, we have that
Qh(T )( jx) = h(QT ( jx));
therefore for the log transformation, we should consider a model for bidding times distribution as,
QT ( jx) = expfx0()g. It is natural to extend this analysis to the case of time-varying regressors, but
one needs to be careful because the classical proportional hazard model cannot be simply transformed
into an accelerated failure time model (Fitzenberger and Wilke 2006). With this caveat in mind, we
propose to estimate rst a longitudinal model, Qlog(Tit)( jxit). For the estimation and inference of this
model we consider the quantile regression method presented above.
Table 10 presents results on the e¤ect of the information release policy on the log of bidding survival
time distribution, obtained from a model that includes the covariates presented in Table 2 and monthly
dummy variables. Note that, the coe¢ cients 1 and 3 in our previous specications are not identied
because we consider a sample of entrants, but it is possible to estimate 2 at any quantile  . The
coe¢ cient 2() measures the horizontal distance between the conditional distribution of the log of
bidding times before and after the policy change. If the information release has an e¤ect on the survival
probabilities, and consequently on the length of bidding time, we expect to nd positive estimates at
the lower quantiles.
We nd estimates of 2 ranging from 0.59 to 0.88 at the center of the conditional distribution,
which suggest that the median bidding time duration increased at least expf0:59g  1:80, or roughly
80 percent after the information release. The e¤ect at the 0.25 quantile is also positive and signi-
cant, suggesting a 28 percent increase after the information release among entrants who stop bidding
relatively soon. These important ndings suggest that entrants continue bidding in the market for a
longer period of time after the policy change.
Table 11 presents additional results, obtained this time from a model that not only includes the
covariates and monthly dummy variables from Table 10, but also large rm and project e¤ects to
24The accelerated failure time (AFT) model represents a general class of survival models including the Exponential
and Gamma parametric models as particular cases (see, e.g., Lancaster 1990). The log version of the accelerated failure
time model includes as a particular case the Cox (1972) model with Weibull baseline hazard.
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Variable Quantile
.25 .40 .50 .60 .75
After March 2000 .246 .589 .670 .882 1.011
(.124) (.225) (.343) (.304) (.158)
Bidders facing entrants 1.228 1.511 1.412 1.305 .996
(.191) (.442) (.673) (.613) (.326)
Bidders facing entrants after -.713 -1.098 -1.094 -1.031 -.708
March 2000 (.209) (.469) (.716) (.653) (.350)
Expected number of bidders .015 -.016 -.042 .042 .009
(.019) (.037) (.061) (.057) (.029)
Capacity utilized 1.170 .640 .519 .506 .500
(.120) (.236) (.378) (.330) (.168)
Distance to the project location -.121 -.217 -.235 -.238 -.223
(.020) (.040) (.064) (.058) (.029)
Firms past winning to bidding .593 1.138 1.191 .789 .217
ratio (.206) (.339) (.478) (.382) (.171)
Rivals average winning to plan .458 -.760 -1.921 -2.081 -1.305
holder ratio (.341) (.742) (1.307) (1.181) (.788)
Closest rivals distance to the .023 .097 .132 .135 .147
project location (.020) (.038) (.060) (.054) (.030)
Rivals minimum backlog .005 .022 .015 .010 .009
(.008) (.015) (.025) (.022) (.013)
Seasonally unadjusted .197 .316 .275 .277 .211
unemployment rate (.062) (.118) (.183) (.162) (.085)
Three month average of the real .123 -.028 .233 .367 .347
volume of projects (.121) (.234) (.3730) (.333) (.164)
Three month average of the -1.051 -.960 -.485 -.090 .410
number of building permits (.457) (.870) (1.348) (1.202) (.638)
Number of Observations 397 397 397 397 397
Table 10: Quantile regression results for log of bidding times. The model includes monthly dummy
variables.  Denotes statistical signicance at the 5 percent level and  denotes statistical signicance
at the 10 percent level.
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Variable Quantile
.25 .40 .50 .60 .75
After March 2000 .318 .403 .519 .616 .694
(.191) (.267) (.279) (.181) (.081)
Bidders facing entrants 1.319 .912 .831 .884 .784
(.316) (.511) (.553) (.335) (.170)
Bidders facing entrants after -.650 -.394 -.361 -.433 -.431
March 2000 (.351) (.550) (.596) (.362) (.182)
Expected number of bidders .004 .024 .003 -.038 .007
(.032) .048 (.051) (.033) (.156)
Capacity utilized 1.072 .750 .734 .679 .504
(.202) (.292) (.313) (.190) (.081)
Distance to the project location -.148 -.206 -.215 -.187 -.201
(.034) (.050) (.053) (.032) (.014)
Firms past winning to bidding -.002 .329 .454 .570 .433
ratio (.321) (.420) (.401) (.229) (.095)
Rivals average winning to plan -.083 -.350 -.792 -.813 -.616
holder ratio (.586) (.962) (1.100) (.764) (.274)
Closest rivals distance to the .026 .042 .053 .039 .069
project location (.035) (.051) (.052) (.033) (.015)
Rivals minimum backlog -.007 .018 .011 -.003 .004
(.013) (020) (.021) (.013) (.006)
Seasonally unadjusted .258 .340 .331 .297 .306
unemployment rate (.100) .146 (.149) (.097) (.041)
Three month average of the real -.065 .167 .146 .093 .221
volume of projects (.206) (.289) (.307) (.200) (.087)
Three month average of the -1.382 -.966 -.955 -.295 -.300
number of building permits (.718) (1.044) (1.100) (.705) (.326)
Number of Observations 397 397 397 397 397
Table 11: Quantile regression results for log of bidding times. The model includes monthly dummy
variables, as well as large rms xed e¤ects and projects type dummies.  Denotes statistical
signicance at the 5 percent level and  denotes statistical signicance at the 10 percent level.
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control for unobserved heterogeneity25 . We nd that now the estimates range from 0.40 to 0.61 at
the center of the log of bidding times distribution. At the median, entrants length of bidding time
duration in the Oklahoma market seems to increase by (expf0:52g 1)  :68 percent after March 2000.
The e¤ect in the lower tail is positive and signicant, suggesting that the release of the engineering
cost information increased the length of bidding time by 37 percent.
The previous analysis does not incorporate the fact that entrants may plan to submit bids t periods
ahead. We try to address this issue by estimating a model for the number of times an entrant bids
in the Oklahoma procurement auctions, conditional on the covariates x:26 The results are presented
in Figure 4. The continuous dotted line shows the estimates, and the shaded region in each panel
represents .95 percent (pointwise) condence interval. We observe now that the di¤erence between the
distributions of the response before and after the policy change tends to disappear beyond the 0.30
quantile. In the lower tail, however, the e¤ect of the release of information is positive and signicant,
suggesting that the length of bidding in the market increased roughly 60 percent after March 2000.
Moreover, while the vast majority of the control variables seem to have no e¤ect on the distribution of
the log of the maximum bidding time duration, as bidders capacity utilization increases and bidders
distance to a project decreases, the bidding length tends to be higher, improving the prospects for
survival.
The previous quantile regression model does not address explicitly the potential issue of censored
observations. Note that, entrants submit bids at di¤erent points in time, and by the end of the
sample period, they have censored spells. Portnoy (2003) proposes a censored quantile regression
approach assuming that the duration times and the censoring times are independent, conditional on
the covariates. We use this approach as a robustness check, exploring the possibility that random
censoring is a¤ecting our previous conclusions. We estimate a model for the number of bids submitted
25We also estimated the models using number of plan holders instead of expected number of bidders. The evidence
is consistent with the nding that entrants continue bidding in the market for a longer period of time after the policy
change.
26 In this case, we essentially let the quantile regression mimic the time varying e¤ect of the covariates. Our setting can
be interpreted as a particular case of a model with time-varying coe¢ cients, log(Ti(t)) = x0itt+ui(t); where Ti denotes
bidding time at duration t. While this model includes coe¢ cient changing over time, the quantile regression coe¢ cient
( )s changes as a function of the quantile (Fitzenberger and Wilke 2006).
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Figure 4: Bidding Times Distribution. The models include project type dummies based on the de-
scription of the model. We report the estimates of the e¤ects of interest. The continuous dotted lines
show the estimates, and the shaded region represents a .95 (pointwise) condence interval.
39
by an entrant conditional on mean values of the covariates.27 We nd that the results are similar in
nature to the ones described in Figure 4. For instance, the shape of the censored quantile regression
point estimates for the e¤ect after the policy change is similar to the one described in the previous
gure, presenting an estimate equal to 0.52 in the lower tail. Summing up, we nd that among all the
variants of the model and methods we have considered, the median entrantsbidding times increased
after March 2000. The ndings also suggest that among entrants that exit the procurement auctions
relatively soon, the release of information increased their bidding duration at least 28 percent.
5 Conclusions
In April 2000, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation started releasing the states internal es-
timate of the costs to complete highway construction auctions. This paper examines the e¤ect of
this policy change on bidding and participation di¤erences across two groups of bidders: entrants and
incumbents. In light of our ndings, we then examine the implications of the observed changes on the
duration of the entrantspresence in the procurement auctions.
We nd that overall, the release of the engineering cost estimate prior to bidding reduces infor-
mational asymmetries and as a result entrants and incumbents bid more alike. When we introduce
xed e¤ects to control for di¤erences in private costs, we nd that entrants (a) submit relatively more
aggressive low bids before the policy change and (b) adjust fully their bidding behavior after the
policy change to correct for their earlier lack of information. Entrants adjust their bidding behav-
ior roughly 20 percent more than the incumbents after the policy change. These results are similar
when we change the specication of the dependent variable, and we control for auction and project
unobserved heterogeneity.
As far as participation is concerned, the results indicate that entrants bid less frequently overall
than incumbents do, but win with a higher probability, conditional on bidding. This behavior is
una¤ected by the policy change.
27Portnoy (2003) considers a model with time invariant covariates, recognizing that one disadvantage of the approach
appears when the independent variables change over time. The approach remains to be developed, but a simple solution
could be to replace the time varying covariate by its average value during the spell.
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The fact that entrants behave more like the experienced incumbents after the information release,
without lowering their probability of a win, suggests the possibility that their prot margin increases
(or their losses are reduced) after the policy change, a¤ecting their prospects for survival in this
market. We consider the entrantssurvival by measuring the number of months entrants submitted
bids, and examine any potential change in their behavior induced by the release of information on the
engineering cost estimate. Simple nonparametric estimates suggest that the probability that an entrant
will continue bidding declines more rapidly over time in the period before the information release than
in the period after. While controlling for observed heterogeneity, we nd that at the median level,
their length of presence in the Oklahoma procurement auctions increased by 68 percent. Furthermore,
entrants that used to exit relatively soon continue bidding 37 percent more after the policy change.
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